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A Survey on the Detection of Android Malicious Apps∗
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Abstract
Android-based smart devices are exponentially growing, and due to
the ubiquity of the Internet, these devices are globally connected to the
different devices/networks. Its popularity, attractive features, and mobil-
ity make malware creator to put number of malicious apps in the market
to disrupt and annoy the victims. Although to identify the malicious
apps, time-to-time various techniques are proposed. However, it appears
that malware developers are always ahead of the anti-malware group, and
the proposed techniques by the anti-malware groups are not sufficient to
counter the advanced malicious apps. Therefore, to understand the vari-
ous techniques proposed/used for the identification of Android malicious
apps, in this paper, we present a survey conducted by us on the work done
by the researchers in this field.
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1 Introduction
In 1992 International Business Machines Corporation came up with a proto-
type mobile computing device incorporating with the Personal Digital Assis-
tant features (demonstrated it in the Computers Dealer’s Exhibition). Later
on, Simon Personal Communicator first designed a device that was referred as
smart device/phone which receives calls, sends faxes, emails and more. The
smart devices/phone technology continued to advance throughout early 2000,
and in 2007 Android-based smart device was unveiled by Google. Since then
the popularity/demand for Android-based smart devices is continuously grow-
ing. An estimate shows that more than 15 billion smart devices are connected
globe-wise and are expected to be reaching 200 billion by the end of the year
2020 [8]. Also, due to the mobility and the attractive features of these devices
have drastically changed our day-to-day life. Many of these functionalities are
very much similar to our other information technology systems and are capable
to remotely access the enterprise’s data for the work. In addition, because of
the ubiquity of Internet ubiquity, the user uses these devices for the shopping,
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financial transactions, share private information/data, etc. [21]. Hence, the
security risks of the smart devices are now at never seen before levels, hence
an attractive target for online attackers. Also, nowadays online criminal are
investing more and more for the sophisticated attacks, e.g., ransomware or to
steal the valuable personal data/information from it.
Today in the growing smart devices, Android is the most popular operating
system (OS) (∼ 70% of the market share) [13], and are connected to different
devices/networks through the Internet (five out of six mobile phones are Android
based [37]). The popularity of Android OS is because of its open source, java
supported free rich software developer’s kit, exponential increase in the Android-
based apps, and third-party distribution. According to Statista, in addition to
the third-party Android apps, at Google Play store, there are ∼2 ×106 apps
are available for the users [41], and some of these apps may be malicious [1].
Therefore, the probability of the malware in the Android smart devices is now
at never seen before levels. Thus attacks on the Android-based smart devices
are increasing exponentially, basically due to the ease of creating the variants
of malware [42] [6]. In 2013, there was a 200% increase in the malicious apps,
and 3.7 million of variants added in McAfee’s database [7]. In 2015, Kaspersky
reported that the growth rate of new malware variant is 300% with 0.88 million
new variants [20]. The number of malicious installations found in 2015 was
around three million, and around seven thousand mobile banking Trojans were
also found in the same year [19]. In the 3rd quarter of 2015 Quick Heal Threat
Research reported that per day they had received ∼4.2 × 105 samples of the
Windows and Android platforms [21]. Trend Micro estimated that the number
of malicious mobile apps would reach 20 million by the end of 2017 [9]. In
this, stepping up its fight against bad apps and malicious developers, Google
has removed over 700,000 Android apps (i.e., 70% more apps that violated the
Google Play policies in 2017 than the apps they removed in 2016) from Play
Store and also took down as many as 100,000 bad developers in 2017 [2].
The recent attacks on Android devices show that the security features in
these devices are not good enough to stop the adversary [38]. Therefore, its a
need of time to design a robust anti-malware, in particular, to counter zero-day
attack [35]. Also, it is an open question, how to detect the variants of malicious
Android apps which are concealed in the 3rd party apps markets [1], and how
to find the repackaged apps in the ocean of Android apps. In addition, to avoid
the deployed detection methods, malware developer uses various obfuscation
techniques [36]. Hence, any gap in the security of the Android smart devices
will allow the attacker to access the information stored in it. To defend the
attack/threat from the Android malicious apps, a number of static and dynamic
methods were proposed [4], [22],[26], [11]. But still, it appears that to defend
the malicious apps, the proposed techniques are not good enough in the growing
smart devices usage in our day-to-day life [35]. Thus, Android based smart
devices security is one of the important fields to be addressed, and understanding
the market share of the Android-based smart devices, in this paper to know the
various techniques proposed/used to identify the Android malicious apps, in
section 2, to understand security mechanism of the Android devices we discuss
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in brief that how user data and its resources are secure by providing the features
viz. sandbox, permission, secure inter-component communication, and signing
the apps. In section 3, we present the survey conducted by us on the work
done by the researchers in this field. Finally, in section 4, we summarize our
conclusion.
2 Security Mechanisms
The security of the Android-based devices are mainly focused to protect the user
data, its resources, and isolation of the application by providing the features viz.
sandbox, permission, secure inter-component communication, and signing the
apps. In this, the sandbox in the Android based system isolate the apps from
each other by the user ID (UID) and permissions. After installation, the apps
runs in its assigned sandbox and can access only its own resources, unless other
apps give explicit access permission to this applications. However, if the apps
are designed by the same developer, then such apps can share the same UID
and can run in the same sandbox to share resources/data between them.
Android apps consist of four components viz., services, broadcasts, activities,
and providers. Similar to Inter Processes Communication in the Linux system, it
provides a secure Inter-Component Communication by binder mechanism
(middleware layer of Android). Inter-Component Communication is achieved by
the intents/message, and these intents are explicitly used for the communication,
if it identifies the receiver name, or used for implicit communication that allows
the receiver to know that can it access this intent or not.
Application signing creates a certification between developers and their
applications to ensure the security of the apps, and before putting it in its sand-
box, it makes a relationship between the apps and UID. Without application
signing, apps will not run. If two or more apps have the same UID, then all
the apps which have the same UID can communicate with each other, share the
permissions and can run in the same sandbox. By the application singing, apps
update process can be simplified. The updated new version will have all the per-
missions that the old version has, and also the certificate does not change so that
the package manager can verify the certificate. It also makes sure that with-
out using Inter-Component Communication, apps cannot communicate with
another apps. However, if the apps are developed by the same developer, then
the developer without changing the application signing can enable the direct
communication between the same developer apps.
In these smart devices, there are four levels of permissions viz. signature-
OrSystem (granted to the apps that are installed by the root or pre-installed
apps), signature (granted within the same sandbox), dangerous (granted by the
users) and normal (granted automatically) permissions. In total there are 235
permissions out of which 163 are hardware accessible and remaining are for user
information access [24]. Before installation of the apps, the system asks the
users to grant all requested permissions, if users agree and grant the requested
permissions to the apps, then in general installation becomes successful else it
3
may get canceled. These permissions mechanisms put some restriction when
the apps want to access the application programming interface (API) which
are sensitive to the OS. The Android apps run in the sandbox, and if it needs
to access resources/data outside its sandbox which could potentially affect the
user’s privacy/data viz. short message service, contacts, camera, location, etc.
then the user has to approve/reject the permission.
3 Detection of Android Malicious Apps
To identify the Android malicious apps, static and dynamic analysis are the
two basic methods that are used [17]. In both the methods classifiers are first
trained with a dataset for the classification of apps. However, in static analysis,
apps are analyzed without executing it to extract some patterns viz. APIs
used, data flow, permissions, control flow, intents, etc. Whereas, in the dynamic
analysis the codes are analyzed during the execution of the apps, and monitoring
its dynamic behavior (resources usage, tracing system calls, API call, network
traffic, etc.) and the response of the system. In this, in 2009, understanding that
the users do not understand what applications will do with their data/resources,
and thus not able to decide which permissions shall be allowed to the application
to run with, Fuchs, et al., [12] proposed a tool called SCANDROID (suppose
to be the first program analysis tool for the Android-based devices) which can
extracts security specifications from the applications, and can identify that the
data flow of such apps are consistent with the specification or not.
In 2012 Sanz. et al. [28] based on machine-learning techniques proposed
a method to detect the Android malicious apps by automatically characterize
the applications. For the classification, the feature sets used are the printable
strings, apps permissions, and the apps permissions extracted from the Android
Market. Their experiment with seven different categories (820 samples) and five
classifiers shows that among the selected five classifiers, Bayes Tree Augmented
Naive Bayes is the best classifier (0.93 area under the curve (AUC)), while
random forest (RF) stands second in the investigated classifier (0.9 AUC), and
among the analyzed classifier, the worst was Decision Tree with J48 (0.64 AUC).
Wu. et al., based on the static feature proposed a technique called DroidMat, to
detect the Android malicious apps which analyze AndroidManifest.xml and the
systems calls. For the experiment, they used 238 malicious and 15000 benign
programs and claimed that their approach is very effective (97.87% accuracy),
scalable and efficient [43].
In 2013 Michael et al. proposed a mobile-sandbox to automatically analyze
the Android apps in two steps. In the first step (static analysis), applications
Manifest files are parsed and decompiled; then they find that the applications
are using suspicious permissions/intents or not. In the next step, dynamic
analysis is performed, where the apps are executed to know all the actions
including those originating from the associated API calls. They experimented
with ∼ 36,000 apps from the third-party Asian mobile markets and reported
that 24% of all analyzed apps use associated calls. [40]. Min Zheng et al.
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[45] developed a signature based system called DroidAnalytics for collecting the
malware automatically, and to generate signatures for the identification of the
malicious code segment. They conducted extensive experiments with 150,368
apps and detected 2,494 malicious apps from one hundred two different families,
in which three hundred forty-two of them were zero-day malicious samples from
the six different families. They claimed that their methods have significant
advantages over the traditional MD5 hash based signature, and can be a valuable
tool for the classification of Android malicious apps.
In 2014, a detection method was proposed by Quentin et al. which depends
on the opcode-sequences. They tested libsvm and SVM classifier with the re-
duced data set (11,960 malware and 12,905 benign applications) and obtained
0.89% F-measure. However, their approach is not capable to detect completely
different malware [15]. Kevin Allix et al. [3] devised classifiers that depend
on the features set that are designed from the apps control flow graphs. They
analyzed their techniques with ∼50,000 Android apps and claimed that their
approach outperformed existing machine learning approaches. Also from the
analysis, they concluded that for the realistic malware detectors, the 10-fold
cross-validation approach on the usual dataset is not a reliable indicator of the
performance of the classifier.
The smartphone can act as like a zombie device, controlled by the hackers
via command and control servers. It has been found that mobile malware are
targeting Android devices to get root level access so that from the remote server
they can execute the instructions. Hence, such type of malware will be a big
threat to the homeland security. Therefore Seo, et al. [30] discusses the defining
characteristics which are inherent in the devices and shown the feasible mobile
attack scenario against the Homeland security. They analyze various mobile
malware samples viz. monitoring the home and office, banking, flight booking
and tracking, from both the unofficial and official market to identify the poten-
tial vulnerabilities. Their analysis shows that the two banking apps (axis and
mellat bank app) charges SMS for malicious activities and two other banking
apps was modified to get permissions without the consent. Finally, they discuss
an approach that mitigates the Homeland Security from the malware threats.
In 2015, Jehyun Lee et al. developed a technique to detect the malicious
apps that use automated extraction of the family signature. They claimed that
compare to earlier behavior analysis techniques their proposed family signature
matching detection accuracy is high and can detect variants of known malware
more accurately and efficiently than the legacy signature matching. Their re-
sults were based on the analysis done with the 5846 real Android malicious apps
which belong to 48 families collected in April 2014 and achieved 97% accuracy.
Smita et al. [23] addressed the problem of system-call injection attack (inject
independent and irrelevant system-calls when programs are executing) and pro-
posed a solution which is evasion-proof and is not vulnerable to the system-call
injection attacks. Their technique characterizes the program semantics by using
the property of asymptotic equipartition, which allows to find the information-
rich call sequences to detect the malicious apps. According to their analysis,
the semantically-relevant paths can be applied to know the malicious behavior
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and also to identify the number of unseen/new malware. They claimed that
the proposed solution is robust against the system-call injection attacks and are
effective to detect the real malware instances.
In 2016, a host-based Android malicious apps detection system called Multi-
Level Anomaly Detector for Android Malware (MADAM) has been proposed by
Saracino, et al. [29]. Their system at the same time can analyze and correlates
the features at 4 levels viz., application, kernel, user and package to identify.
It stopped the malicious behaviors of one hundred twenty-five known malware
families, encompasses most of the malware. They claimed that MADAM could
understand the behaviors characteristics of almost all the real malicious apps
which can be known in the wild, and it can block more than 96% of Android
malicious apps. Their analysis on 9,804 clean apps shows low false alarm rate,
limited battery consumption (4% energy overhead), and negligible performance
overhead. BooJoong et al. [16], proposed an n-opcode based static analysis for
the classification and categorizing the Android malware. Their approach does
not utilize the defined features viz. permissions, API calls, intents, and other
application properties, rather it automatically discovers the features that elimi-
nate the need of an expert to find the required promising features. Empirically
they showed that by using the occurrence of n-opcodes, a reasonable classifica-
tion accuracy can be achieved, and for n = 3 and n = 4, they have achieved
F-measure up to 98% for categorization and classification of the malware.
Based on inter-component communication (ICC) related features, Ke Xu et
al. [44] proposed a method to identify the malicious apps called ICCDetector,
which can capture the interaction between the components or cross application
boundaries. They evaluated the performance of their approach with 5264 mal-
ware and 12026 benign apps and achieved an accuracy of 97.4%. Also, after
manually analyzing, they discovered 43 new malware in the benign data and
reduced the number of false positive to seven. Jae-wook Jang et al. [14] pro-
posed a feature-rich hybrid anti-malware system called Andro-Dumpsys, which
can identify and classify the malware groups of similar behaviour. They claimed
that Andro-Dumpsys could detect the malware and classify the malware families
with low false positive (FP) and false negative (FN). It is also scalable and capa-
ble to respond zero-day threats. Gerardo Canfora et al. [5] evaluated a couple
of techniques for detecting the malicious apps. First one was based on hidden
markov model, and the 2nd exploits the structural entropy. They claimed that
their approach is effective for Desktops viruses, and can also classify the mali-
cious apps. Experimentally they achieved a precision of 0.96 to differentiate the
malicious apps, and 0.978 to detect the malware family [5]. For the detection
of malware in runtime, Sanjeev Das et al. [10] proposed a hardware-enhanced
architecture calledGuardOL by using field programmable gate arrays and pro-
cessor. Their approach after extracting the system calls made the features from
the high-level semantics of the malicious behavior. Then the features are used
to train the classifier and multilayer perceptron to detect the malicious apps
during the execution. The importance of their design was that the approach in
the first 30% of the execution detects 46% of the malware, and after 100% of
execution 97% of the samples have been identified with 3% FP. [10].
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In 2017, Ali Feizollah et al. [11] proposed AndroDialysis to evaluate how
effective is the Android intents (implicit and explicit) as a feature to identify
the malicious apps. They showed that the intents are semantically rich features
compared to well studied other features viz. permissions, to know the inten-
tions of malware. However, they also concluded that such features are not the
ultimate solution, and it should be used together with other known promising
features. Their result was based on the analysis of the dataset of 7406 apps
(1846 clean and 5560 infected apps). They achieved a 91% detection accuracy
by using Android Intent, 83% using Android permission and by combining both
the features they obtained the detection rate of 95.5%. They claimed that for
the malware detection, Intent is more effective than the permission. Bahman
Rashidi et al. [26] proposed an Android resources usage risk assessment called
XDroid. They claimed that the malware detection accuracy could be increased
significantly by using the temporal behavior tracking, and security alerts of the
suspicious behaviors can be generated. Also, in real-time their model can in-
form users about the risk level of the apps, and can dynamically update the
parameters of the model by the user’s preferences and from the on-line algo-
rithm. They conducted the experiment on benchmark Drebin malware dataset
and demonstrated that their approach could estimate the risk levels of the mal-
ware up to 82% accuracy and with the user input it can provide an adaptive
risk assessment.
Recently, Ashu et al. [31] with the benchmark Drebin dataset and first with-
out making any groups, they examine the five classifiers using the opcodes occur-
rence as a feature for the identification of malicious applications and achieved
detection accuracy up to 79.27% by functional tree classifier. They observed
that the overall accuracy is mainly affected by the FP. However, highest true
positive (99.91%) is obtained by RF and fluctuates least with the number of
features compared to the remaining four classifiers. Their analysis shows that
overall accuracy mainly depends on the FP of the investigated classifiers. Later
on, in 2018, similar to the analysis of Windows Desktop malware classification
[32] [34] [27], they group-wise analyzed the dataset based on permissions and
achieved up to 97.15% overall average accuracy [33]. They observed that the MI-
CROPHONE group detection accuracy is least while CALENDAR group apps
are detected with maximum accuracy, and top 80-100 features are good enough
to achieve the best accuracy. As far as the true positive (TP) is concerned, RF
gives best TP for the CALENDAR group.
4 Summary
The attack/threat by the malware to the Android-based smart devices which are
connected to different devices/networks through the Internet is increasing day-
by-day. Consequently, these smart devices are highly vulnerable to the advanced
malware, and its effect will be highly destructive if an effective and timely
counter-measures are not deployed. Therefore, time-to-time, various static and
dynamic methods that have been proposed by the authors for the identification
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of the Android malicious apps have been discussed in this paper to counter the
advanced malicious apps in the fast-growing Internet and smart devices usage
into our daily life. Although in literature various survey viz. [25] [18] [39] are
available on the detection Android malicious but in this survey, we presented
the comparative study of various approaches and the observations done by the
various authors understanding that all malware are not of the same type and
cannot be detected with one algorithm.
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